{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"A Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Winner Rules","authors":[{"name":"Martin Lackner","slug":"martin-lackner","given":"Martin","family":"Lackner","affiliation":"TU Wien , Vienna , Austria"},{"name":"Piotr Skowron","slug":"piotr-skowron","given":"Piotr","family":"Skowron","affiliation":"University of Warsaw , Warsaw , Poland"}],"abstract":"To choose a suitable multi-winner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an \"optimal\" subset.In this paper, we offer a new perspective on measuring the quality of such subsets and---consequently---of multi-winner rules. We provide a quantitative analysis using methods from the theory of approximation algorithms and estimate how well multi-winner rules approximate two extreme objectives: diversity as captured by the Approval Chamberlin--Courant rule and individual excellence as captured by Multi-winner Approval Voting. With both theoretical and experimental methods we classify multi-winner rules in terms of their quantitative alignment with these two opposing objectives.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/58","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/58","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0058.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/58.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/58","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":58,"pages":{"first":407,"last":413},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Anshelevich et al., 2018] E. 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