{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Multigoal Committee Selection","authors":[{"name":"Maciej Kocot","slug":"maciej-kocot","given":"Maciej","family":"Kocot","affiliation":"AGH University , Krakow , Poland"},{"name":"Anna Kolonko","slug":"anna-kolonko","given":"Anna","family":"Kolonko","affiliation":"AGH University , Krakow , Poland"},{"name":"Edith Elkind","slug":"edith-elkind","given":"Edith","family":"Elkind","affiliation":"University of Oxford , Oxford , UK"},{"name":"Piotr Faliszewski","slug":"piotr-faliszewski","given":"Piotr","family":"Faliszewski","affiliation":"AGH University , Krakow , Poland"},{"name":"Nimrod Talmon","slug":"nimrod-talmon","given":"Nimrod","family":"Talmon","affiliation":"Ben-Gurion University , Be'er Sheva , Israel"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of computing committees that perform well according to several different criteria, which are expressed as committee scoring rules. We analyze the computational complexity of computing such committees and provide an experimental evaluation of the compromise levels that can be achieved between several well-known rules, including k-Borda, SNTV, Bloc, and the Chamberlin--Courant rule.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/55","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/55","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0055.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/55.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/55","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":55,"pages":{"first":385,"last":391},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2016] Haris Aziz, Jérôme Lang, and Jérôme Monnot. 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