{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Schelling Games on Graphs","authors":[{"name":"Edith Elkind","slug":"edith-elkind","given":"Edith","family":"Elkind","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , University of Oxford"},{"name":"Jiarui Gan","slug":"jiarui-gan","given":"Jiarui","family":"Gan","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , University of Oxford"},{"name":"Ayumi Igarashi","slug":"ayumi-igarashi","given":"Ayumi","family":"Igarashi","affiliation":"Department of Mathematical Informatics , University of Tokyo"},{"name":"Warut Suksompong","slug":"warut-suksompong","given":"Warut","family":"Suksompong","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , University of Oxford"},{"name":"Alexandros A. Voudouris","slug":"alexandros-a-voudouris","given":"Alexandros A.","family":"Voudouris","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , University of Oxford"}],"abstract":"We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in which case they will always choose their preferred location, or strategic, in which case they aim to maximize the fraction of agents of their own type in their neighborhood. We investigate the existence of equilibria in these games, study the complexity of finding an equilibrium outcome or an outcome with high social welfare, and also provide upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy and stability. Some of our results extend to the setting where the preferences of the agents over their neighbors are defined by a social network rather than a partition into types.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/38","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/38","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0038.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/38.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/38","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":38,"pages":{"first":266,"last":272},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alba and Logan, 1993] Richard D. 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