{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs","authors":[{"name":"Sankarshan Damle","slug":"sankarshan-damle","given":"Sankarshan","family":"Damle","affiliation":"Machine Leaning Lab , International Institute of Information Technology , Hyderabad"},{"name":"Moin Hussain Moti","slug":"moin-hussain-moti","given":"Moin Hussain","family":"Moti","affiliation":"Machine Leaning Lab , International Institute of Information Technology , Hyderabad"},{"name":"Praphul Chandra","slug":"praphul-chandra","given":"Praphul","family":"Chandra","affiliation":"KoineArth , Bangalore"},{"name":"Sujit Gujar","slug":"sujit-gujar","given":"Sujit","family":"Gujar","affiliation":"Machine Leaning Lab , International Institute of Information Technology , Hyderabad"}],"abstract":"In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project's provision.  In this work, we present novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/30","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/30","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0030.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/30.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/30","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":30,"pages":{"first":208,"last":214},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alaei et al., 2016] Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Mohamed Mostagir. 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