{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods","authors":[{"name":"Hau Chan","slug":"hau-chan","given":"Hau","family":"Chan","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science and Engineering , University of Nebraska-Lincoln , USA"},{"name":"Jing Chen","slug":"jing-chen","given":"Jing","family":"Chen","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Stony Brook University , USA"},{"name":"Bo Li","slug":"bo-li","given":"Bo","family":"Li","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Stony Brook University , USA"},{"name":"Xiaowei Wu","slug":"xiaowei-wu","given":"Xiaowei","family":"Wu","affiliation":"Faculty of Computer Science , University of Vienna , Austria"}],"abstract":"We study envy-free allocations of indivisible goods to agents in settings where each agent is unaware of the goods allocated to other agents. In particular, we propose the maximin aware (MMA) fairness measure, which guarantees that every agent, given the bundle allocated to her, is aware that she does not envy at least one other agent, even if she does not know how the other goods are distributed among other agents. We also introduce two of its relaxations, and discuss their egalitarian guarantee and existence. Finally, we present a polynomial-time algorithm, which computes an allocation that approximately satisfies MMA or its relaxations. Interestingly, the returned allocation is also 1/2-approximate EFX when all agents have sub- additive valuations, which improves the algorithm in [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/20","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/20","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0020.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/20.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/20","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":20,"pages":{"first":137,"last":143},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Abebe et al., 2017] Rediet Abebe, Jon Kleinberg, and David C Parkes. 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