{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Portioning Using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency","authors":[{"name":"Stéphane Airiau","slug":"stephane-airiau","given":"Stephane","family":"Airiau","affiliation":"LAMSADE , CNRS , Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL University"},{"name":"Haris Aziz","slug":"haris-aziz","given":"Haris","family":"Aziz","affiliation":"UNSW Sydney and Data61"},{"name":"Ioannis Caragiannis","slug":"ioannis-caragiannis","given":"Ioannis","family":"Caragiannis","affiliation":"University of Patras"},{"name":"Justin Kruger","slug":"justin-kruger","given":"Justin","family":"Kruger","affiliation":"LAMSADE , CNRS , Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL University"},{"name":"Jérôme Lang","slug":"jerome-lang","given":"Jérôme","family":"Lang","affiliation":"LAMSADE , CNRS , Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL University"},{"name":"Dominik Peters","slug":"dominik-peters","given":"Dominik","family":"Peters","affiliation":"University of Oxford; CSIRO"}],"abstract":"A public divisible resource is to be divided among projects. We study rules that decide on a distribution of the budget when voters have ordinal preference rankings over projects. Examples of such portioning problems are participatory budgeting, time shares, and parliament elections. We introduce a family of rules for portioning, inspired by positional scoring rules. Rules in this family are given by a scoring vector (such as plurality or Borda) associating a positive value with each rank in a vote, and an aggregation function such as leximin or the Nash product. Our family contains well-studied rules, but most are new. We discuss computational and normative properties of our rules. We focus on fairness, and introduce the SD-core, a group fairness notion. Our Nash rules are in the SD-core, and the leximin rules satisfy individual fairness properties. Both are Pareto-efficient.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/2","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/2","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0002.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/2.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/2","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":2,"pages":{"first":11,"last":17},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz and Stursberg, 2014] H. 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