{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Fairness Towards Groups of Agents in the Allocation of Indivisible Items","authors":[{"name":"Nawal Benabbou","slug":"nawal-benabbou","given":"Nawal","family":"Benabbou","affiliation":"Sorbonne Université , CNRS , Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6 , LIP6 F-75005 Paris , France"},{"name":"Mithun Chakraborty","slug":"mithun-chakraborty","given":"Mithun","family":"Chakraborty","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , National University of Singapore , Singapore"},{"name":"Edith Elkind","slug":"edith-elkind","given":"Edith","family":"Elkind","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , University of Oxford , United Kingdom"},{"name":"Yair Zick","slug":"yair-zick","given":"Yair","family":"Zick","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , National University of Singapore , Singapore"}],"abstract":"In this paper, we study the problem of matching a set of items to a set of agents partitioned into types so as to balance fairness towards the types against overall utility/efficiency. We extend multiple desirable properties of  indivisible goods allocation to our model and investigate the possibility and hardness of achieving combinations of these properties, e.g. we prove that maximizing utilitarian social welfare under constraints of typewise envy-freeness up to one item (TEF1) is computationally intractable. We also define a new concept of waste for this setting, show experimentally that augmenting an existing algorithm with a marginal utility maximization heuristic can produce a TEF1 solution with reduced waste, and also provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a non-wasteful TEF1 allocation for binary agent-item utilities.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2019/14","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/14","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/0014.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/14.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/bibtex/14","volume":{"slug":"2019","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2019","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2019/","year":2019,"location":"Macao","dates":"10-16 August 2019","editors":"Sarit Kraus","isbn":"978-0-9992411-4-1","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2019"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":14,"pages":{"first":95,"last":101},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Barman et al., 2018a] Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy, and Yadati Narahari. 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