{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Truthful Fair Division without Free Disposal","authors":[{"name":"Xiaohui Bei","slug":"xiaohui-bei","given":"Xiaohui","family":"Bei","affiliation":"School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences , Nanyang Technological University"},{"name":"Guangda Huzhang","slug":"guangda-huzhang","given":"Guangda","family":"Huzhang","affiliation":"School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences , Nanyang Technological University"},{"name":"Warut Suksompong","slug":"warut-suksompong","given":"Warut","family":"Suksompong","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Stanford University"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works, they rely crucially on the free disposal assumption, meaning that the mechanism is allowed to throw away part of the resource at no cost. In the present work, we remove this assumption and focus on mechanisms that always allocate the entire resource. We exhibit a truthful envy-free mechanism for cake cutting and chore division for two agents with piecewise uniform valuations, and we complement our result by showing that such a mechanism does not exist when certain additional assumptions are made. Moreover, we give truthful mechanisms for multiple agents with restricted classes of valuations.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/9","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/9","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0009.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/9.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/9","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":9,"pages":{"first":63,"last":69},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alijani et al., 2017] Reza Alijani, Majid Farhadi, Moham- mad Ghodsi, Masoud Seddighin, and Ahman S. 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