{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules","authors":[{"name":"Haris Aziz","slug":"haris-aziz","given":"Haris","family":"Aziz","affiliation":"UNSW Sydney and Data61 (CSIRO) , Australia"},{"name":"Piotr Faliszewski","slug":"piotr-faliszewski","given":"Piotr","family":"Faliszewski","affiliation":"AGH University of Science and Technology , Krakow , Poland"},{"name":"Bernard Grofman","slug":"bernard-grofman","given":"Bernard","family":"Grofman","affiliation":"University of California , Irvine , USA"},{"name":"Arkadii Slinko","slug":"arkadii-slinko","given":"Arkadii","family":"Slinko","affiliation":"University of Auckland , Auckland , New Zealand"},{"name":"Nimrod Talmon","slug":"nimrod-talmon","given":"Nimrod","family":"Talmon","affiliation":"Ben-Gurion University , Be'er Sheva , Israel"}],"abstract":"We introduce and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees---as is done in the utilitarian variants---the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter. We focus on five rules, which are egalitarian analogues of SNTV, the k-Borda rule, the Chamberlin--Courant rule, the Bloc rule, and the Pessimist rule. We establish their computational complexity, provide their initial axiomatic study, and perform experiments to represent the action of these rules graphically.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/8","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/8","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0008.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/8.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/8","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":8,"pages":{"first":56,"last":62},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aleskerov et al., 2010] F. 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