{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems (Extended Abstract)","authors":[{"name":"Natasha Alechina","slug":"natasha-alechina","given":"Natasha","family":"Alechina","affiliation":"University of Nottingham"},{"name":"Joseph Y. Halpern","slug":"joseph-y-halpern","given":"Joseph Y.","family":"Halpern","affiliation":"Cornell University"},{"name":"Ian A. Kash","slug":"ian-a-kash","given":"Ian A.","family":"Kash","affiliation":"Microsoft Research"},{"name":"Brian Logan","slug":"brian-logan","given":"Brian","family":"Logan","affiliation":"University of Nottingham"}],"abstract":"We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). In this extended abstract, we outline the approach of [Alechina et al., 2018], and show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/781","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/781","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0781.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/781.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/781","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Journal track","track":"Journal track","number":781,"pages":{"first":5543,"last":5547},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Coordination and Cooperation","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Normative systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alechina et al., 2018] Natasha Alechina, Joseph Y. Halpern, Ian A. Kash, and Brian Logan. Incentive- compatible mechanisms for norm monitoring in open multi-agent systems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 62:421-446, 2018. (To appear).","title":"Incentivecompatible mechanisms for norm monitoring in open multi-agent systems","authors":"Natasha Alechina, Joseph Y Halpern, Ian A Kash, Brian Logan","year":"2018","venue":"Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Dastani et al., 2009] Mehdi Dastani, Davide Grossi, John- Jules Ch. Meyer, and Nick Tinnemeier. Normative multi- agent programs and their logics. In John-Jules Ch. Meyer and Jan Broersen, editors, Knowledge Representation for Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, volume 5605 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 16-31. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.","title":"Normative multiagent programs and their logics","authors":"Mehdi Dastani, Davide Grossi, John-Jules Ch, Nick Meyer, Tinnemeier","year":"2009","venue":"Knowledge Representation for Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Fagundes et al., 2014] Moser Silva Fagundes, Sascha Os- sowski, and Felipe Meneguzzi. Analyzing the tradeoff be- tween efficiency and cost of norm enforcement in stochas- tic environments. In 21st European Conference on Ar- tificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014), pages 1003-1004. IOS Press, 2014.","title":"Analyzing the tradeoff between efficiency and cost of norm enforcement in stochastic environments","authors":"Silva Moser, Sascha Fagundes, Felipe Ossowski, Meneguzzi","year":"2014","venue":"21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Friedman et al., 2006] Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern, and Ian A. Kash. Efficiency and Nash equilibria in a scrip system for P2P networks. In Proceedings 7th ACM Con- ference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), pages 140- 149. ACM, 2006.","title":"Efficiency and Nash equilibria in a scrip system for P2P networks","authors":"Eric J Friedman, Joseph Y Halpern, Ian A Kash","year":"2006","venue":"Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Kash et al., 2012] Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, and Joseph Y. Halpern. Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion. Distributed Com- puting, 25(5):335-357, 2012.","title":"Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion","authors":"Ian A Kash, Eric J Friedman, Joseph Y Halpern","year":"2012","venue":"Distributed Computing","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Kash et al., 2015] Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, and Joseph Y. Halpern. An equilibrium analysis of scrip sys- tems. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(3), 2015. Article No. 13.","title":"An equilibrium analysis of scrip systems","authors":"Ian A Kash, Eric J Friedman, Joseph Y Halpern","year":"2015","venue":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}