{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Stackelberg Security Games: Looking Beyond a Decade of Success","authors":[{"name":"Arunesh Sinha","slug":"arunesh-sinha","given":"Arunesh","family":"Sinha","affiliation":"University of Michigan"},{"name":"Fei Fang","slug":"fei-fang","given":"Fei","family":"Fang","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University"},{"name":"Bo An","slug":"bo-an","given":"Bo","family":"An","affiliation":"Nanyang Technological University"},{"name":"Christopher Kiekintveld","slug":"christopher-kiekintveld","given":"Christopher","family":"Kiekintveld","affiliation":"University of Texas at El Paso"},{"name":"Milind Tambe","slug":"milind-tambe","given":"Milind","family":"Tambe","affiliation":"University of Southern California"}],"abstract":"The Stackelberg Security Game (SSG) model has been immensely influential in security research since it was introduced roughly a decade ago. Furthermore, deployed SSG-based applications are one of most successful examples of game theory applications in the real world. We present a broad survey of recent technical advances in SSG and related literature, and then look to the future by highlighting the new potential applications and open research problems in SSG.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/775","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/775","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0775.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/775.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/775","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Survey track","track":"Survey track","number":775,"pages":{"first":5494,"last":5501},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Multidisciplinary Topics and Applications: Security and Privacy","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Basak et al., 2016] Anjon Basak, Fei Fang, Thanh Hong Nguyen, and Christopher Kiekintveld. 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