{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets","authors":[{"name":"Weiwei Wu","slug":"weiwei-wu","given":"Weiwei","family":"Wu","affiliation":"School of Computer Science and Engineering , Southeast University , China"},{"name":"Xiang Liu","slug":"xiang-liu","given":"Xiang","family":"Liu","affiliation":"School of Computer Science and Engineering , Southeast University , China"},{"name":"Minming Li","slug":"minming-li","given":"Minming","family":"Li","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , City University of Hong Kong , Hong Kong , China"}],"abstract":"This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items  as possible from the strategic sellers. Each seller holds an item with public value and is allowed to bid its private cost.  Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones.  The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded.  Our main contribution  is a random  mechanism  that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility,  the truthfulness on the sellers' side and the buyers' side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/76","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/76","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0076.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/76.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/76","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":76,"pages":{"first":548,"last":554},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Anari et al., 2014] Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, and Afshin Nikzad. Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An opti- mal 1-1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on, pages 266-275. IEEE, 2014.","title":"Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1-1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets","authors":"Anari","year":"2014","venue":"Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Badanidiyuru et al., 2012] Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Robert Kleinberg, and Yaron Singer. Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 128-145. ACM, 2012.","title":"Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement","authors":"Badanidiyuru","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Bei et al., 2012] Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, and Pinyan Lu. Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian. In Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 449-458. ACM, 2012.","title":"Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian","authors":"Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Chen et al., 2011] Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, and Pinyan Lu. On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms. In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM sym- posium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 685-699. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2011.","title":"On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms","authors":"Ning Chen, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Clarke, 1971] Edward H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of pub- lic goods.\" public choice, 11: 17-33. Public Choice, 11(1):17-33, 1971.","title":"Multipart pricing of public goods","authors":"Edward H Clarke","year":"1971","venue":"public choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016] Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Bart De Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, and Stefano Turchetta. Approximately efficient double auctions with strong budget balance. In Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 1424-1443. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2016.","title":"Approximately efficient double auctions with strong budget balance","authors":"Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Bart De Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Stefano Turchetta","year":"2016","venue":"Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Dobzinski and Leme, 2014] Shahar Dobzinski and Rena- to Paes Leme. Efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets. In International Colloquium on Automata, Lan- guages, and Programming, pages 392-404. Springer, 2014.","title":"Efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets","authors":"Leme Dobzinski, Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes, Leme","year":"2014","venue":"International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Dobzinski et al., 2011] Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H Pa- padimitriou, and Yaron Singer. Mechanisms for complement-free procurement. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 273-282, 2011.","title":"Mechanisms for complement-free procurement","authors":"Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Dütting et al., 2014] Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Modularity and greed in double auc- tions. In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation, pages 241-258. ACM, 2014. Ferraioli et al., 2016]","title":"Modularity and greed in double auctions","authors":"Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Serafino, and Carmine Ventre. What to verify for optimal truthful mech- anisms without money. In Proceedings of the 2016 Inter- national Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, pages 68-76. International Foundation for Au- tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016.","title":"What to verify for optimal truthful mechanisms without money","authors":"Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre","year":"2016","venue":"Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Gao et al., 2015] Yang Gao, Yan Chen, and KJ Ray Liu. On cost-effective incentive mechanisms in microtask crowd- sourcing. IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelli- gence and AI in Games, 7(1):3-15, 2015.","title":"On cost-effective incentive mechanisms in microtask crowdsourcing","authors":"Yang Gao, Yan Chen, Ray Liu","year":"2015","venue":"IEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Groves, 1973] Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. E- conometrica, 41(4):617-631, 1973.","title":"Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams","authors":"Groves","year":"1973","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Hirai and Sato, 2017] Hiroshi Hirai and Ryosuke Sato. Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets. arX- iv preprint arXiv:1708.04881, 2017.","title":"Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets","authors":"Sato Hirai, Hiroshi Hirai, Ryosuke Sato","year":"2017","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Klemperer, 1999] Paul Klemperer. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of economic surveys, 13(3):227- 286, 1999.","title":"Auction theory: A guide to the literature","authors":"Paul Klemperer","year":"1999","venue":"Journal of economic surveys","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Lu and Xiao, 2015] Pinyan Lu and Tao Xiao. Improved ef- ficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets. In Proceed- ings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 397-413. ACM, 2015.","title":"Improved efficiency guarantees in auctions with budgets","authors":"Pinyan Lu, Tao Xiao","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[McAfee, 1992] R Preston McAfee. A dominant strategy double auction. Journal of economic Theory, 56(2):434- 450, 1992.","title":"A dominant strategy double auction","authors":"Preston Mcafee","year":"1992","venue":"Journal of economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983] Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite. Efficient mechanism for bilater- al trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 29(2):265-281, 1983.","title":"Efficient mechanism for bilateral trading","authors":"Roger B Myerson, Mark A Satterthwaite","year":"1983","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Myerson, 1981] Roger B Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58-73, 1981.","title":"Optimal auction design","authors":"Roger B Myerson","year":"1981","venue":"Mathematics of operations research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Penna and Ventre, 2014] Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre. Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games and Economic Behavior, 86:491-509, 2014.","title":"Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification","authors":"Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre","year":"2014","venue":"Games and Economic Behavior","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Segal-Halevi et al., 2016] Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Has- sidim, and Yonatan Aumann. Sbba: a strongly-budget- balanced double-auction mechanism. In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 260-272. Springer, 2016.","title":"Sbba: a strongly-budgetbalanced double-auction mechanism","authors":"Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann","year":"2016","venue":"International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Singer and Mittal, 2011] Yaron Singer and Manas Mittal. Pricing tasks in online labor markets. In Proceedings of the 11th AAAI Conference on Human Computation, pages 55-60. AAAI Press, 2011.","title":"Pricing tasks in online labor markets","authors":"Mittal Singer, Yaron Singer, Manas Mittal","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the 11th AAAI Conference on Human Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Singer, 2010] Yaron Singer. Budget feasible mechanisms. In 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Com- puter Science (FOCS), pages 765-774, 2010.","title":"Budget feasible mechanisms","authors":"Yaron Singer","year":"2010","venue":"51st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":23,"raw":"[Vickrey, 1961] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auc- tions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1):8-37, 1961.","title":"Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders","authors":"William Vickrey","year":"1961","venue":"Journal of Finance","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}