{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Designing the Game to Play: Optimizing Payoff Structure in Security Games","authors":[{"name":"Zheyuan Ryan Shi","slug":"zheyuan-ryan-shi","given":"Zheyuan Ryan","family":"Shi","affiliation":"Swarthmore College , USA"},{"name":"Ziye Tang","slug":"ziye-tang","given":"Ziye","family":"Tang","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University , USA"},{"name":"Long Tran-Thanh","slug":"long-tran-thanh","given":"Long","family":"Tran-Thanh","affiliation":"University of Southampton , UK"},{"name":"Rohit Singh","slug":"rohit-singh","given":"Rohit","family":"Singh","affiliation":"World Wide Fund for Nature , Cambodia"},{"name":"Fei Fang","slug":"fei-fang","given":"Fei","family":"Fang","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University , USA"}],"abstract":"We study Stackelberg Security Games where the defender, in addition to allocating defensive resources to protect targets from the attacker, can strategically manipulate the attacker’s payoff under budget constraints in weighted L^p-norm form regarding the amount of change. For the case of weighted L^1-norm constraint, we present (i) a mixed integer linear program-based algorithm with approximation guarantee; (ii) a branch-and-bound based algorithm with improved efficiency achieved by effective pruning; (iii) a polynomial time approximation scheme for a special but practical class of problems. In addition, we show that problems under budget constraints in L^0 and weighted L^\\infty-norm form can be solved in polynomial time.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/71","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/71","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0071.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/71.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/71","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":71,"pages":{"first":512,"last":518},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Basilico et al., 2016] N. 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