{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments","authors":[{"name":"Weiran Shen","slug":"weiran-shen","given":"Weiran","family":"Shen","affiliation":"Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences , Tsinghua University"},{"name":"Zihe Wang","slug":"zihe-wang","given":"Zihe","family":"Wang","affiliation":"Institute for Theoretical Computer Science , Shanghai University of Finance"},{"name":"Song Zuo","slug":"song-zuo","given":"Song","family":"Zuo","affiliation":"Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences , Tsinghua University"}],"abstract":"Motivated by online ad auctions, we consider a repeated auction between one seller and many buyers, where each buyer only has an estimation of her value in each period until she actually receives the item in that period. The seller is allowed to conduct a dynamic auction but must guarantee ex-post individual rationality.\r\nIn this paper, we use a structure that we call credit accounts to enable a general reduction from any incentive compatible and ex-ante individual rational dynamic auction to an approximate incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational dynamic auction with credit accounts. Our reduction obtains stronger individual rationality guarantees at the cost of weaker incentive compatibility. Surprisingly, our reduction works without any common knowledge assumption. Finally, as a complement to our reduction, we prove that there is no non-trivial auction that is exactly incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational under this setting.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/70","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/70","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0070.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/70.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/70","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":70,"pages":{"first":505,"last":511},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Agarwal et al., 2009] Nikhil Agarwal, Susan Athey, and David Yang. 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