{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods","authors":[{"name":"Erel Segal-Halevi","slug":"erel-segal-halevi","given":"Erel","family":"Segal-Halevi","affiliation":"Ariel University , Ariel 40700 , Israel"},{"name":"Avinatan Hassidim","slug":"avinatan-hassidim","given":"Avinatan","family":"Hassidim","affiliation":"Bar-Ilan University , Ramat-Gan 52900 , Israel"},{"name":"Yonatan Aumann","slug":"yonatan-aumann","given":"Yonatan","family":"Aumann","affiliation":"Bar-Ilan University , Ramat-Gan 52900 , Israel"}],"abstract":"Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. However, existing mechanisms are either not truthful, do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single type of good. We extend the random-sampling technique used in earlier works to multi-good markets where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We show a prior free, truthful and strongly-budget-balanced mechanism which guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when the market sizes of all goods grow to infinity at a similar rate.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/68","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/68","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0068.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/68.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/68","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":68,"pages":{"first":489,"last":497},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Babaioff et al., 2014] Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, and Renato Paes Leme. 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