{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods","authors":[{"name":"Erel Segal-Halevi","slug":"erel-segal-halevi","given":"Erel","family":"Segal-Halevi","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Ariel University"},{"name":"Warut Suksompong","slug":"warut-suksompong","given":"Warut","family":"Suksompong","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science , Stanford University"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group's share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. Our protocols approximate both envy-freeness and maximin-share fairness. As an example, for two groups of agents with additive valuations, our protocol yields an allocation that is envy-free up to one good and gives at least half of the maximin share to at least half of the agents in each group.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/67","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/67","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0067.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/67.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/67","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":67,"pages":{"first":482,"last":488},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Babaioff et al., 2017] Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 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