{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Service Exchange Problem","authors":[{"name":"Julien Lesca","slug":"julien-lesca","given":"Julien","family":"Lesca","affiliation":"Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , 75016 Paris , France"},{"name":"Taiki Todo","slug":"taiki-todo","given":"Taiki","family":"Todo","affiliation":"Department of Informatics , Kyushu University , Motooka 744 , Fukuoka , Japan"}],"abstract":"In this paper, we study the service exchange problem where each agent is willing to provide her service in order to receive in exchange the service of someone else. We assume that agent's preference depends both on the service that she receives and the person who receives her service. This framework is an extension of the housing market problem to preferences including a degree of externalities. We investigate the complexity of computing an individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation of services to agents for ordinal preferences, and the complexity of computing an allocation which maximizes either the utility sum or the utility of the least served agent for cardinal preferences.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/49","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/49","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0049.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/49.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/49","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":49,"pages":{"first":354,"last":360},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz and de Keijzer, 2012] Haris Aziz and Bart de Keijzer. Housing markets with indifferences: A tale of two mech- anisms. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012.","title":"Housing markets with indifferences: A tale of two mechanisms","authors":"Aziz, De Keijzer, ; Haris, Aziz, Bart De Keijzer","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2016] Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Jérôme Lang, Julien Lesca, and Jérôme Monnot. Optimal reallocation under additive and ordinal preferences. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, pages 402-410, 2016.","title":"Optimal reallocation under additive and ordinal preferences","authors":"Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Jérôme Lang, Julien Lesca, Jérôme Monnot","year":"2016","venue":"Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Bartholdi et al., 1989] III Bartholdi, J.J., C.A. Tovey, and M.A. Trick. The computational difficulty of manipulat- ing an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227-241, 1989.","title":"The computational difficulty of manipulating an election","authors":"J J Iii Bartholdi, C A Tovey, M A Trick","year":"1989","venue":"Social Choice and Welfare","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Berman and Karpinski, 2003] Piotr Berman and Marek Karpinski. Improved approximation lower bounds on small occurrence optimization. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 10(008), 2003.","title":"Improved approximation lower bounds on small occurrence optimization","authors":"Piotr Berman, Marek Karpinski","year":"2003","venue":"Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Bouveret et al., 2016] Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre, and Nicolas Maudet. Fair allocation of indivisible goods. In Handbook of Computational Social Choice, pages 284- 310. 2016.","title":"Fair allocation of indivisible goods","authors":"Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre, Nicolas Maudet","year":"2016","venue":"Handbook of Computational Social Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Chevaleyre et al., 2006] Yann Chevaleyre, Paul E Dunne, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Michel Lemaitre, Nicolas Maudet, Julian Padget, Steve Phelps, Juan A Rodriguez- Aguilar, and Paulo Sousa. Issues in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica, 30(1), 2006.","title":"Issues in multiagent resource allocation","authors":"Yann Chevaleyre, Paul E Dunne, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Michel Lemaitre, Nicolas Maudet, Julian Padget, Steve Phelps, Juan A Rodriguez-Aguilar, Paulo Sousa","year":"2006","venue":"Informatica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Fujita et al., 2015] Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. A complexity ap- proach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivis- ible goods under lexicographic preferences. In Proceed- ings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 907-913, 2015.","title":"A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences","authors":"Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Gourvès et al., 2017] Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, and Anaëlle Wilczynski. Object allocation via swaps along a social network. In Proceedings of the 26th Interna- tional Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 213-219, 2017.","title":"Object allocation via swaps along a social network","authors":"Gourvès","year":"2017","venue":"Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":"/proceedings/2017/31"},{"position":9,"raw":"[Kuhn, 1955] H. W. Kuhn. The Hungarian method for the assignment problem. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 2(1-2):83-97, 1955.","title":"The Hungarian method for the assignment problem","authors":"H W Kuhn","year":"1955","venue":"Naval Research Logistics Quarterly","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Lesca and Perny, 2010] Julien Lesca and Patrice Perny. LP solvable models for multiagent fair allocation problems. In Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 387-392, 2010.","title":"LP solvable models for multiagent fair allocation problems","authors":"Julien Lesca, Patrice Perny","year":"2010","venue":"Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Lesca et al., 2013] Julien Lesca, Michel Minoux, and Patrice Perny. Compact versus noncompact LP formula- tions for minimizing convex Choquet integrals. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 161(1-2):184-199, 2013.","title":"Compact versus noncompact LP formulations for minimizing convex Choquet integrals","authors":"Julien Lesca, Michel Minoux, Patrice Perny","year":"2013","venue":"Discrete Applied Mathematics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Ma, 1994] Jinpeng Ma. Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities. International Journal of Game Theory, 23(1):75-83, 1994.","title":"Jinpeng Ma. Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities","authors":"Ma","year":"1994","venue":"International Journal of Game Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Mumcu and Saglam, 2007] Ayse Mumcu and Ismail Saglam. The core of a housing market with externalities. Economics Bulletin, 3(57):1-5, 2007.","title":"The core of a housing market with externalities","authors":"Saglam Mumcu, Ayse Mumcu, Ismail Saglam","year":"2007","venue":"Economics Bulletin","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Pini et al., 2011] Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, K. Brent Venable, and Toby Walsh. Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage pro- cedures. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 22(1):183-199, 2011.","title":"Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures","authors":"Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, K Brent Venable, Toby Walsh","year":"2011","venue":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Shapley and Scarf, 1974] Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Eco- nomics, 1(1):23-37, 1974.","title":"Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf. On cores and indivisibility","authors":"Scarf Shapley","year":"1974","venue":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Sikdar et al., 2017] Sujoy Sikdar, Sibel Adali, and Lirong Xia. Mechanism design for multi-type housing markets. In Proceedings of the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 684-690, 2017.","title":"Mechanism design for multi-type housing markets","authors":"Sujoy Sikdar, Sibel Adali, Lirong Xia","year":"2017","venue":"Proceedings of the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Sönmez, 1999] Tayfun Sönmez. Strategy-proofness and es- sentially single-valued cores. Econometrica, 67(3):677- 689, 1999.","title":"Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores","authors":"Tayfun Sönmez, Sönmez","year":"1999","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Sonoda et al., 2014] Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Two case studies for trading multiple indivisible goods with indifferences. In Proceed- ings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 791-797, 2014.","title":"Two case studies for trading multiple indivisible goods with indifferences","authors":"Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Teo et al., 2001] Chung-Piaw Teo, Jay Sethuraman, and Wee-Peng Tan. Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem re- visited: Strategic issues and applications. Management Science, 47(9):1252-1267, September 2001.","title":"Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem revisited: Strategic issues and applications","authors":"Chung-Piaw Teo, Jay Sethuraman, Wee-Peng Tan","year":"2001","venue":"Management Science","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Todo et al., 2014] Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, and Makoto Yokoo. Strategyproof exchange with multiple private en- dowments. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 805-811, 2014.","title":"Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments","authors":"Todo","year":"2014","venue":"Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}