{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting","authors":[{"name":"Martin Lackner","slug":"martin-lackner","given":"Martin","family":"Lackner","affiliation":"Technische Universität Wien , Austria"},{"name":"Piotr Skowron","slug":"piotr-skowron","given":"Piotr","family":"Skowron","affiliation":"University of Warsaw , Poland"}],"abstract":"We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of strategic voting: independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), monotonicity, and SD-strategyproofness. In this paper, we systematically analyze multiwinner rules based on these axioms and provide a fine-grained picture of their resilience to strategic voting. Both our axiomatic and experimental analysis show that approval-based multiwinner rules are generally very susceptible to strategic voting---with one exception: multiwinner approval voting.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/47","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/47","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0047.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/47.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/47","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":47,"pages":{"first":340,"last":346},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"Arrow, 1950","title":null,"authors":"Arrow","year":"1950","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"K. 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