{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking","authors":[{"name":"Adrian Haret","slug":"adrian-haret","given":"Adrian","family":"Haret","affiliation":"TU Wien , Institut für Logic and Computation 192-02 , Favoritenstraße 9-11 , 1040 Wien , Austria"},{"name":"Hossein Khani","slug":"hossein-khani","given":"Hossein","family":"Khani","affiliation":"Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny , F-75775 Paris cedex 16 , France"},{"name":"Stefano Moretti","slug":"stefano-moretti","given":"Stefano","family":"Moretti","affiliation":"Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny , F-75775 Paris cedex 16 , France"},{"name":"Meltem Öztürk","slug":"meltem-ozturk","given":"Meltem","family":"Öztürk","affiliation":"Université Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny , F-75775 Paris cedex 16 , France"}],"abstract":"We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/42","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/42","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0042.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/42.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/42","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":42,"pages":{"first":303,"last":309},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting","Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Knowledge Representation and  Game Theory ; Social Choice"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Banzhaf, 1965] John F. 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