{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"On Fair Price Discrimination in Multi-Unit Markets","authors":[{"name":"Michele Flammini","slug":"michele-flammini","given":"Michele","family":"Flammini","affiliation":"Gran Sasso Science Institute , L'Aquila , Italy; University of L'Aquila , L'Aquila , Italy"},{"name":"Manuel Mauro","slug":"manuel-mauro","given":"Manuel","family":"Mauro","affiliation":"Gran Sasso Science Institute , L'Aquila , Italy"},{"name":"Matteo Tonelli","slug":"matteo-tonelli","given":"Matteo","family":"Tonelli","affiliation":"Gran Sasso Science Institute , L'Aquila , Italy"}],"abstract":"Discriminatory pricing policies, even if at first glance can be perceived as unfair, are widespread. In fact, pricing differences for the same item among different national markets are common, or forms of discrimination based on the time of purchase, like in tickets' sales.\r\nIn this work we propose a framework for capturing the setting of ``fair'' discriminatory pricing and study its application to multi-unit markets, in which many copies of the same item are on sale. Our model is able to incorporate the fundamental discrimination settings proposed in the literature, by expressing individual buyers constraints for assigning prices by means of a social relationship graph, modeling the information that each buyer can acquire about the prices assigned to the other buyers.\r\nAfter pointing out the positive effects of fair price discrimination, we investigate the computational complexity of maximizing the social welfare and the revenue in these markets, providing hardness and approximation results under various assumptions on the buyers valuations and on the social graph topology.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/34","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/34","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0034.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/34.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/34","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":34,"pages":{"first":247,"last":253},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Abebe et al., 2017] R. 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