{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms","authors":[{"name":"Diodato Ferraioli","slug":"diodato-ferraioli","given":"Diodato","family":"Ferraioli","affiliation":"University of Salerno , Italy"},{"name":"Carmine Ventre","slug":"carmine-ventre","given":"Carmine","family":"Ventre","affiliation":"University of Essex , UK"}],"abstract":"Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017], is to find a small set (possibly, the smallest) of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines or verifying a linear number of agents.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2018/33","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/33","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0033.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/33.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/bibtex/33","volume":{"slug":"2018","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/","year":2018,"location":"Stockholm","dates":"13-19 July 2018","editors":"Jérôme Lang","isbn":"978-0-9992411-2-7","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2018"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":33,"pages":{"first":240,"last":246},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic Paradigms, Auctions and Market-Based Systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Adamczyk et al., 2015] Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, and Stefano Leonardi. 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