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The goal of this paper is to present this class and to invite researchers to study its properties (computational and axiomatic alike).","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/734","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/734","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0734.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/734.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/734","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Early Career","track":"Early Career","number":734,"pages":{"first":5121,"last":5125},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2015] H. 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