{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling (Extended Abstract)","authors":[{"name":"Xujin Chen","slug":"xujin-chen","given":"Xujin","family":"Chen","affiliation":"AMSS , Chinese Academy of Sciences ,"},{"name":"Xiaodong Hu","slug":"xiaodong-hu","given":"Xiaodong","family":"Hu","affiliation":"AMSS , Chinese Academy of Sciences ,"},{"name":"Tie-Yan Liu","slug":"tie-yan-liu","given":"Tie-Yan","family":"Liu","affiliation":"Microsoft Research"},{"name":"Weidong Ma","slug":"weidong-ma","given":"Weidong","family":"Ma","affiliation":"Microsoft Research"},{"name":"Tao Qin","slug":"tao-qin","given":"Tao","family":"Qin","affiliation":"Microsoft Research"},{"name":"Pingzhong Tang","slug":"pingzhong-tang","given":"Pingzhong","family":"Tang","affiliation":"Tsinghua University ,"},{"name":"Changjun Wang","slug":"changjun-wang","given":"Changjun","family":"Wang","affiliation":"Beijing University of Technology"},{"name":"Bo Zheng","slug":"bo-zheng","given":"Bo","family":"Zheng","affiliation":"Tsinghua University ,"}],"abstract":"This work concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms, and study the maximization of social welfare (i.e., the aggregated value of completed jobs) by competitive analysis. We first derive two lower bounds on the competitive ratio of any deterministic IC mechanism to characterize the landscape of our research: one bound is 5, which holds for equal-length jobs; the other bound is $\\frac{\\kappa}{\\ln\\kappa}+1-o(1)$, which holds for unequal-length jobs, where $\\kappa$ is the maximum ratio between lengths of any two jobs. We then propose a deterministic IC mechanism and show that such a simple mechanism works very well for two models: (1) In the preemption-restart model, the mechanism can achieve the optimal competitive ratio of 5 for equal-length jobs and a near optimal ratio of $(\\frac{1}{(1-\\epsilon)^2}+o(1)) \\frac{\\kappa}{\\ln\\kappa}$ for unequal-length jobs, where $0<\\epsilon<1$ is a small constant; (2) In the preemption-resume model, the mechanism can achieve the optimal competitive ratio of 5 for equal-length jobs and a near optimal competitive ratio (within factor 2) for unequal-length jobs.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/707","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/707","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0707.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/707.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/707","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Journal track","track":"Journal track","number":707,"pages":{"first":4985,"last":4989},"keywords":["Planning and Scheduling: Scheduling","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic paradigms, auctions and market-based systems","Combinatorial & Heuristic Search: Combinatorial search/optimisation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Azar et al., 2013] Yossi Azar, Naama Ben-Aroya, Nikhil R Devanur, and Navendu Jain. 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