{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Why You Should Charge Your Friends for Borrowing Your Stuff","authors":[{"name":"Kijung Shin","slug":"kijung-shin","given":"Kijung","family":"Shin","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh , PA , USA"},{"name":"Euiwoong Lee","slug":"euiwoong-lee","given":"Euiwoong","family":"Lee","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh , PA , USA"},{"name":"Dhivya Eswaran","slug":"dhivya-eswaran","given":"Dhivya","family":"Eswaran","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh , PA , USA"},{"name":"Ariel D. Procaccia","slug":"ariel-d-procaccia","given":"Ariel D.","family":"Procaccia","affiliation":"Carnegie Mellon University , Pittsburgh , PA , USA"}],"abstract":"We consider goods that can be shared with k-hop neighbors (i.e., the set of nodes within k hops from an owner) on a social network. We examine incentives to buy such a good by devising game-theoretic models where each node decides whether to buy the good or free ride. First, we find that social inefficiency, specifically excessive purchase of the good, occurs in Nash equilibria. Second, the social inefficiency decreases as k increases and thus a good can be shared with more nodes. Third, and most importantly, the social inefficiency can also be significantly reduced by charging free riders an access cost and paying it to owners, leading to the conclusion that organizations and system designers should impose such a cost. These findings are supported by our theoretical analysis in terms of the price of anarchy and the price of stability; and by simulations based on synthetic and real social networks.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/56","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/56","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0056.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/56.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/56","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":56,"pages":{"first":395,"last":401},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic paradigms, auctions and market-based systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Allouch, 2015] N. 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