{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth","authors":[{"name":"Xiaohui Bei","slug":"xiaohui-bei","given":"Xiaohui","family":"Bei","affiliation":"† School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences , Nanyang Technological University"},{"name":"Ning Chen","slug":"ning-chen","given":"Ning","family":"Chen","affiliation":"† School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences , Nanyang Technological University"},{"name":"Guangda Huzhang","slug":"guangda-huzhang","given":"Guangda","family":"Huzhang","affiliation":"† School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences , Nanyang Technological University"},{"name":"Biaoshuai Tao","slug":"biaoshuai-tao","given":"Biaoshuai","family":"Tao","affiliation":"‡ Department of Computer Science and Engineering , University of Michigan"},{"name":"Jiajun Wu","slug":"jiajun-wu","given":"Jiajun","family":"Wu","affiliation":"† School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences , Nanyang Technological University"}],"abstract":"We study envy-free cake cutting with strategic agents, where each agent may manipulate his private information in order to receive a better allocation. We focus on piecewise constant utility functions and consider two scenarios: the general setting without any restriction on the allocations and the restricted setting where each agent has to receive a connected piece. We show that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism exists in the connected piece scenario, and the same impossibility result for the general setting with some additional mild assumptions on the allocations. Finally, we study a large market model where the economy is replicated and demonstrate that truth-telling converges to a Nash equilibrium.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/507","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/507","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0507.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/507.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/507","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Multidisciplinary Topics and Applications","track":"Main track","number":507,"pages":{"first":3625,"last":3631},"keywords":["Multidisciplinary Topics and Applications: AI and Social Sciences","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory","Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic: Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic paradigms, auctions and market-based systems"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016a] Haris Aziz and Simon Mackenzie. 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