{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Recognizing Top-Monotonic Preference Profiles in Polynomial Time","authors":[{"name":"Krzysztof Magiera","slug":"krzysztof-magiera","given":"Krzysztof","family":"Magiera","affiliation":"AGH University , Krakow , Poland"},{"name":"Piotr Faliszewski","slug":"piotr-faliszewski","given":"Piotr","family":"Faliszewski","affiliation":"AGH University , Krakow , Poland"}],"abstract":"We provide the first polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing if a profile of (possibly weak) preference orders is top-monotonic. Top-monotonicity is a generalization of the notions of single-peakedness and single-crossingness, defined by Barbera and Moreno. Top-monotonic profiles always have weak Condorcet winners and satisfy a variant of the median voter theorem. Our algorithm proceeds by reducing the recognition problem to the SAT-2CNF problem.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/46","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/46","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0046.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/46.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/46","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":46,"pages":{"first":324,"last":330},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic paradigms, auctions and market-based systems"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"Arrow, 1951","title":null,"authors":"Arrow","year":"1951","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"K. 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