{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Contest Design with Uncertain Performance and Costly Participation","authors":[{"name":"Priel Levy","slug":"priel-levy","given":"Priel","family":"Levy","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University , Israel"},{"name":"David Sarne","slug":"david-sarne","given":"David","family":"Sarne","affiliation":"Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University , Israel"},{"name":"Igor Rochlin","slug":"igor-rochlin","given":"Igor","family":"Rochlin","affiliation":"School of Computer Science College of Management , Israel"}],"abstract":"This paper studies the problem of designing contests for settings where a principal seeks to optimize the quality of the best performance obtained, and potential contestants only strategize about whether to participate in the contest, as participation incurs some cost. This type of contest can be mapped to various real-life settings (e.g., an audition, a beauty pageant, technology crowdsourcing). The paper provides a comparative game-theoretic based solution to two variants of the above underlying model: parallel and sequential contest, enabling a characterization of the equilibrium strategies in each.  Special emphasis is placed on the case where the contestants are homogeneous which is often the case in real-life whenever the contestants are basically alike and their ranking in the contest is mostly influenced by some probabilistic factors (e.g., luck).  Here, several (somehow counter-intuitive) properties of the equilibrium are proved, in particular for the sequential contest, leading to a comprehensive characterization of the principal preference between the two.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/43","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/43","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0043.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/43.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/43","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":43,"pages":{"first":302,"last":309},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Economic paradigms, auctions and market-based systems","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Archak and Sundararajan, 2009] Nikolay Archak and Arun Sundararajan. 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