{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Convergence and Quality of Iterative Voting Under Non-Scoring Rules","authors":[{"name":"Aaron Koolyk","slug":"aaron-koolyk","given":"Aaron","family":"Koolyk","affiliation":"Hebrew University of Jerusalem"},{"name":"Tyrone Strangway","slug":"tyrone-strangway","given":"Tyrone","family":"Strangway","affiliation":"University of Toronto"},{"name":"Omer Lev","slug":"omer-lev","given":"Omer","family":"Lev","affiliation":"University of Toronto"},{"name":"Jeffrey S. Rosenschein","slug":"jeffrey-s-rosenschein","given":"Jeffrey S.","family":"Rosenschein","affiliation":"Hebrew University of Jerusalem"}],"abstract":"Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism that assumes all voters are strategic, and allows voters to change their stated preferences as the vote progresses until an equilibrium is reached (at which point no player wishes to change their vote). Previous research established that this process converges to an equilibrium for the plurality and veto voting methods and for no other scoring rule.\r\n\r\nWe consider iterative voting for non-scoring rules, examining the major ones, and show that none of them converge when assuming (as most research has so far) that voters pursue a best response strategy. We investigate other potential voter strategies, with a more heuristic flavor (since for most of these voting rules, calculating the best response is NP-hard); we show that they also do not converge. We then conduct an empirical analysis of the iterative voting winners for these non-scoring rules, and compare the winner quality of various strategies.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/39","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/39","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0039.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/39.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/39","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":39,"pages":{"first":273,"last":279},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Noncooperative Games"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Bartholdi III and Orlin, 1991] John J. 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