{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network","authors":[{"name":"Laurent Gourvès","slug":"laurent-gourves","given":"Laurent","family":"Gourvès","affiliation":"Univ. Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , Paris , France"},{"name":"Julien Lesca","slug":"julien-lesca","given":"Julien","family":"Lesca","affiliation":"Univ. Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , Paris , France"},{"name":"Anaëlle Wilczynski","slug":"anaelle-wilczynski","given":"Anaëlle","family":"Wilczynski","affiliation":"Univ. Paris-Dauphine , PSL Research University , CNRS , LAMSADE , Paris , France"}],"abstract":"This article deals with object allocation where each agent receives a single item. Starting from an initial endowment, the agents can be better off by exchanging their objects. However, not all trades are likely because some participants are unable to communicate. By considering that the agents are embedded in a social network, we propose to study the allocations emerging from a sequence of simple swaps between pairs of neighbors in the network. This model raises natural questions regarding (i) the reachability of a given assignment, (ii) the ability of an agent to obtain a given object, and (iii) the search of Pareto-efficient allocations. We investigate the complexity of these problems by providing, according to the structure of the social network, polynomial and NP-complete cases.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/31","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/31","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0031.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/31.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/31","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":31,"pages":{"first":213,"last":219},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Coordination and cooperation"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Abdulkadiroǧlu and Sönmez, 1998] Atila Abdulka- diroǧlu and Tayfun Sönmez. Random serial dictator- ship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica, 66(3):689-701, 1998.","title":"Atila Abdulkadiroǧlu and Tayfun Sönmez. Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems","authors":"Sönmez Abdulkadiroǧlu","year":"1998","venue":"Econometrica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":2,"raw":"[Abdulkadiroǧlu and Sönmez, 1999] Atila Abdulka- diroǧlu and Tayfun Sönmez. House allocation with existing tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88(2):233-260, 1999.","title":"Atila Abdulkadiroǧlu and Tayfun Sönmez. House allocation with existing tenants","authors":"Sönmez Abdulkadiroǧlu","year":"1999","venue":"Journal of Economic Theory","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":3,"raw":"[Abraham et al., 2005] David J Abraham, Katarína Cechlárová, David F Manlove, and Kurt Mehlhorn. Pareto optimality in house allocation problems. In Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC), pages 1163- 1175, 2005.","title":"Pareto optimality in house allocation problems","authors":"Katarína David J Abraham, David F Cechlárová, Kurt Manlove, Mehlhorn","year":"2005","venue":"Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":4,"raw":"[Anshelevich et al., 2013] Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, and Martin Hoefer. Friendship and stable matching. In Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), pages 49-60, 2013.","title":"Friendship and stable matching","authors":"Anshelevich","year":"2013","venue":"Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":5,"raw":"[Arcaute and Vassilvitskii, 2009] Esteban Arcaute and Sergei Vassilvitskii. Social networks and stable match- ings in the job market. In Proceedings of the 5th In- ternational Workshop on Internet and Network Eco- nomics (WINE), pages 220-231, 2009.","title":"Esteban Arcaute and Sergei Vassilvitskii. Social networks and stable matchings in the job market","authors":"Vassilvitskii Arcaute","year":"2009","venue":"Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":6,"raw":"[Aziz and De Keijzer, 2012] Haris Aziz and Bart De Keijzer. Housing markets with indifferences: A tale of two mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1249-1255, 2012.","title":"Housing markets with indifferences: A tale of two mechanisms","authors":"Aziz, De Keijzer, ;, Haris Aziz, Bart De Keijzer","year":"2012","venue":"Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":7,"raw":"[Aziz et al., 2016] Haris Aziz, Páter Biró, Jérôme Lang, Julien Lesca, and Jérôme Monnot. Optimal realloca- tion under additive and ordinal preferences. In Pro- ceedings of the 15th International Conference on Au- tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 402-410, 2016.","title":"Optimal reallocation under additive and ordinal preferences","authors":"Haris Aziz, Páter Biró, Jérôme Lang, Julien Lesca, Jérôme Monnot","year":"2016","venue":"Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":8,"raw":"[Bodine-Baron et al., 2011] Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christina Lee, Anthony Chong, Babak Hassibi, and Adam Wierman. Peer effects and stability in match- ing markets. In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), pages 117-129, 2011.","title":"Peer effects and stability in matching markets","authors":"Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christina Lee, Anthony Chong, Babak Hassibi, Adam Wierman","year":"2011","venue":"Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":9,"raw":"[Chevaleyre et al., 2005] Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, and Nicolas Maudet. Negotiating over small bundles of resources. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 296-302, 2005.","title":"Negotiating over small bundles of resources","authors":"Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet","year":"2005","venue":"Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":10,"raw":"[Chevaleyre et al., 2006] Yann Chevaleyre, Paul Dunne, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Michel Lemaître, Nico- las Maudet, Julian Padget, Steve Phelps, Juan A Rodrıguez-Aguilar, and Paulo Sousa. Issues in mul- tiagent resource allocation. Informatica, 30(1):3-31, 2006.","title":"Issues in multiagent resource allocation","authors":"Yann Chevaleyre, Paul Dunne, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Michel Lemaître, Nicolas Maudet, Julian Padget, Steve Phelps, Juan A Rodrıguez-Aguilar, Paulo Sousa","year":"2006","venue":"Informatica","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":11,"raw":"[Chevaleyre et al., 2007] Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, and Nicolas Maudet. Allocating goods on a graph to eliminate envy. In Proceedings of the 22nd Confer- ence on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 700-705, 2007.","title":"Allocating goods on a graph to eliminate envy","authors":"Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Nicolas Maudet","year":"2007","venue":"Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":12,"raw":"[Chevaleyre et al., 2008] Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Sylvia Estivie, and Nicolas Maudet. Multiagent re- source allocation in k-additive domains: Preference representation and complexity. Annals of Operations Research, 163(1):49-62, 2008.","title":"Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: Preference representation and complexity","authors":"Chevaleyre","year":"2008","venue":"Annals of Operations Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":13,"raw":"[Damamme et al., 2015] Anastasia Damamme, Aurélie Beynier, Yann Chevaleyre, and Nicolas Maudet. The power of swap deals in distributed resource allocation. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AA- MAS), pages 625-633, 2015.","title":"The power of swap deals in distributed resource allocation","authors":"Anastasia Damamme, Aurélie Beynier, Yann Chevaleyre, Nicolas Maudet","year":"2015","venue":"Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AA-MAS)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":14,"raw":"[Dunne and Chevaleyre, 2008] Paul E Dunne and Yann Chevaleyre. The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes. Theo- retical Computer Science, 396(1-3):113-144, 2008.","title":"The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes","authors":"E Paul, Yann Dunne, Chevaleyre","year":"2008","venue":"Theoretical Computer Science","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":15,"raw":"[Dunne et al., 2005] Paul E Dunne, Michael Wooldridge, and Michael Laurence. The com- plexity of contract negotiation. Artificial Intelligence, 164(1-2):23-46, 2005.","title":"The complexity of contract negotiation","authors":"Michael Paul E Dunne, Michael Wooldridge, Laurence","year":"2005","venue":"Artificial Intelligence","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":16,"raw":"[Easley and Kleinberg, 2010] David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reason- ing about a Highly Connected World. Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2010.","title":"Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World","authors":"Kleinberg Easley, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg","year":"2010","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":17,"raw":"[Endriss et al., 2006] Ulle Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri, and Francesca Toni. Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 25:315-348, 2006.","title":"Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources","authors":"Ulle Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri, Francesca Toni","year":"2006","venue":"Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":18,"raw":"[Gardenfors, 1973] Peter Gardenfors. Assignment prob- lem based on ordinal preferences. Management Sci- ence, 20(3):331-340, 1973.","title":"Assignment problem based on ordinal preferences","authors":"Peter Gardenfors","year":"1973","venue":"Management Science","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":19,"raw":"[Hoefer, 2013] Martin Hoefer. Local matching dynam- ics in social networks. Information and Computation, 222:20-35, 2013.","title":"Local matching dynamics in social networks","authors":"Martin Hoefer, Hoefer","year":"2013","venue":"Information and Computation","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":20,"raw":"[Jackson, 2008] Matthew O Jackson. Social and Eco- nomic Networks. Princeton University Press, 2008.","title":"Social and Economic Networks","authors":"Jackson Matthew","year":"2008","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":21,"raw":"[Klaus et al., 2016] Bettina Klaus, David F Manlove, and Francesca Rossi. Matching under preferences. In Handbook of Computational Social Choice, pages 333- 355. Cambridge University Press, 2016.","title":"Matching under preferences","authors":"Bettina Klaus, David F Manlove, Francesca Rossi","year":"2016","venue":"Handbook of Computational Social Choice","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":22,"raw":"[Manlove, 2013] David F Manlove. Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences, volume 2. World Sci- entific, 2013.","title":"Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences","authors":"David F Manlove","year":"2013","venue":null,"doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":23,"raw":"[Sandholm, 1998] Tuomas W Sandholm. Contract types for satisficing task allocation. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium, pages 23-25, 1998.","title":"Contract types for satisficing task allocation","authors":"W Tuomas, Sandholm","year":"1998","venue":"Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":24,"raw":"[Shapley and Scarf, 1974] Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathe- matical Economics, 1(1):23-37, 1974.","title":"Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf. On cores and indivisibility","authors":"Scarf Shapley","year":"1974","venue":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null},{"position":25,"raw":"[Yoshinaka, 2005] Ryo Yoshinaka. Higher-order match- ing in the linear lambda calculus in the absence of con- stants is NP-complete. In Proceedings of the 16th In- ternational Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications (RTA), pages 235-249, 2005.","title":"Higher-order matching in the linear lambda calculus in the absence of constants is NP-complete","authors":"Ryo Yoshinaka, Yoshinaka","year":"2005","venue":"Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications (RTA)","doi":null,"url":null,"internal_url":null}],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}