{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Voting by sequential elimination with few voters","authors":[{"name":"Sylvain Bouveret","slug":"sylvain-bouveret","given":"Sylvain","family":"Bouveret","affiliation":"LIG -Grenoble INP , France"},{"name":"Yann Chevaleyre","slug":"yann-chevaleyre","given":"Yann","family":"Chevaleyre","affiliation":"LIPN -Univ. Paris-Nord , France"},{"name":"François Durand","slug":"francois-durand","given":"François","family":"Durand","affiliation":"U. Paris-Dauphine , CNRS , PSL , France"},{"name":"Jérôme Lang","slug":"jerome-lang","given":"Jérôme","family":"Lang","affiliation":"CNRS , U. Paris-Dauphine , PSL , France"}],"abstract":"We define a new class of low-communication voting rules, tailored for contexts with few voters and possibly many candidates. These rules are defined by a predefined sequence of voters: at each stage, the designated voter eliminates a candidate, and the last remaining candidate wins. We study both deterministic (non-anonymous) variants, and randomized (and anonymous) versions of these rules. We focus on a subfamily of these rules defined by ``non-interleaved'' sequences. We first focus on the axiomatic properties of our rules. Then we focus on the identification of the non-interleaved sequence that gives the best approximation of the Borda score under the impartial culture. Finally, we apply our rules to randomly generated data. Our conclusion is that, in contexts where there are more candidates than voters, elimination-based rules allow for a very low communication complexity (and especially, avoid asking voters to rank alternatives), and yet can be good approximations of common voting rules, while enjoying a number of good properties.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/19","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/19","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0019.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/19.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/19","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":19,"pages":{"first":128,"last":134},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Agent Communication"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Arnold et al., 1992] Barry. 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