{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Strong Syntax Splitting for Iterated Belief Revision","authors":[{"name":"Gabriele Kern-Isberner","slug":"gabriele-kern-isberner","given":"Gabriele","family":"Kern-Isberner","affiliation":"Fakultät für Informatik , Technische Universität Dortmund , Germany"},{"name":"Gerhard Brewka","slug":"gerhard-brewka","given":"Gerhard","family":"Brewka","affiliation":"Institut für Informatik , Universität Leipzig , Germany"}],"abstract":"AGM theory is the most influential formal account of belief revision. Nevertheless, there are some issues with the original proposal. In particular, Parikh has pointed out that completely irrelevant information may be affected in AGM revision. To remedy this, he proposed an additional axiom (P) aiming to capture (ir)relevance by a notion of syntax splitting. In this paper we generalize syntax splitting from logical sentences to epistemic states, a step which is necessary to cover iterated revision.  The generalization is based on the notion of marginalization of epistemic states. Furthermore, we study epistemic syntax splitting in the context of ordinal conditional functions. Our approach substantially generalizes the semantical treatment of (P) in terms of faithful preorders recently presented by Peppas and colleagues.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/157","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/157","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0157.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/157.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/157","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic","track":"Main track","number":157,"pages":{"first":1131,"last":1137},"keywords":["Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic: Logics for Knowledge Representation","Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Logic: Belief Change"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Alchourrón et al., 1985] Carlos E. 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