{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Preferences","authors":[{"name":"Haris Aziz","slug":"haris-aziz","given":"Haris","family":"Aziz","affiliation":"CSIRO and UNSW Sydney , Australia"},{"name":"Ronald de Haan","slug":"ronald-de-haan","given":"Ronald","family":"de Haan","affiliation":"Baharak Rastegari University of Bristol Bristol , UK"},{"name":"Baharak Rastegari","slug":"baharak-rastegari","given":"Baharak","family":"Rastegari","affiliation":"University of Amsterdam Amsterdam , the Netherlands"}],"abstract":"The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider this problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with uncertainty leads to a number of interesting questions including the following ones. How to compute an assignment with the highest probability of being Pareto optimal? What is the complexity of computing the probability that a given assignment is Pareto optimal? Does there exist an assignment that is Pareto optimal with probability one? We consider these problems under two natural  uncertainty models: (1) the lottery model in which each agent has an independent probability distribution over linear orders and (2) the joint probability model that involves a joint probability distribution over preference profiles. For both of these models, we present a number of algorithmic and complexity results highlighting the difference and similarities in the complexity of the two models.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2017/12","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/12","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/0012.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/12.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/bibtex/12","volume":{"slug":"2017","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2017","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2017/","year":2017,"location":"Melbourne, Australia","dates":"19-25 August 2017","editors":"Carles Sierra","isbn":"978-0-9992411-0-3","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2017"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":12,"pages":{"first":77,"last":83},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Social Choice Theory"],"videos":[],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998] Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sönmez. 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