{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response","authors":[{"name":"Hongyao Ma","slug":"hongyao-ma","given":"Hongyao","family":"Ma","affiliation":""},{"name":"Valentin Robu","slug":"valentin-robu","given":"Valentin","family":"Robu","affiliation":""},{"name":"Na Li","slug":"na-li","given":"Na","family":"Li","affiliation":""},{"name":"David C. Parkes","slug":"david-c-parkes","given":"David C.","family":"Parkes","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"We study the problem of incentivizing reliable demand-response in modern electricity grids. Each agent is uncertain about her future ability to reduce demand and unreliable. Agents who choose to participate in a demand-response scheme may be paid when they respond and penalized otherwise. The goal is to reliably achieve a demand reduction target while selecting a minimal set of agents from those willing to participate. We design incentive-aligned, direct and indirect mechanisms. The direct mechanism elicits both response probabilities and costs, while the indirect mechanism elicits willingness to accept a penalty in the case of non-response. We benchmark against a spot auction, in which demand reduction is purchased from agents when needed. Both the direct and indirect mechanisms achieve the reliability target in a dominant-strategy equilibrium, select a small number of agents to prepare, and do so at low cost and with much lower variance in payments than the spot auction.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/57","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/0057.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/57.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/bibtex/57","volume":{"slug":"2016","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2016","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/","year":2016,"location":"New York, NY, USA","dates":"9–15 July 2016","editors":"Subbarao Kambhampati","isbn":"978-1-57735-770-4; 978-1-57735-771-1","publisher":"AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":null,"track":"","number":57,"pages":{"first":352,"last":357},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}