Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 236-241.
Abstract
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding the preferences of the other voters. In reality, however, voters only have incomplete information, which limits their ability to manipulate. We explore how these limitations affect both the manipulability of voting rules and the dynamics of systems in which voters may repeatedly update their own vote in reaction to the moves made by others. We focus on the Plurality, Veto, k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and Maximin voting rules, and consider several types of information that are natural in the context of these rules, namely information on the current front-runner, on the scores obtained by each alternative, and on the majority graph induced by the individual preferences.
@inproceedings{ijcai2016p41,
title = {Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information},
author = {Endriss, Ulrich and Obraztsova, Svetlana and Polukarov, Maria and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-16}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Subbarao Kambhampati},
pages = {236--241},
year = {2016},
month = {7},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/41},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information AU - Endriss, Ulrich AU - Obraztsova, Svetlana AU - Polukarov, Maria AU - Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-16 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2016 SP - 236 EP - 241 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/41 ER -Copied
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