Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 88-93.
Abstract
Several methods exist for making collective decisions on a set of variables when voters possibly have preferential dependencies. None is based on approval voting. We define a family of rules for approval-based voting on combinatorial domains, where voters cast conditional approval ballots, allowing them to approve values of a variable conditionally on the values of other variables. We study three such rules. The first two generalize simple multiwinner approval voting and minimax approval voting. The third one is an approval-based version of sequential voting on combinatorial domains. We study some properties of these rules, and compare their outcomes.
@inproceedings{ijcai2016p20,
title = {Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains},
author = {Barrot, Nathanaël and Lang, Jérôme},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-16}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Subbarao Kambhampati},
pages = {88--93},
year = {2016},
month = {7},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/20},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains AU - Barrot, Nathanaël AU - Lang, Jérôme T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-16 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2016 SP - 88 EP - 93 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2016/20 ER -Copied
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