{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"A Characterization of n-Player Strongly Monotone Scheduling Mechanisms","authors":[{"name":"Annamária Kovács","slug":"annamaria-kovacs","given":"Annamária","family":"Kovács","affiliation":""},{"name":"Angelina Vidali","slug":"angelina-vidali","given":"Angelina","family":"Vidali","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"Our work deals with the important problem of globally characterizing truthful mechanisms where players have multi-parameter, additive valuations, like scheduling unrelated machines or additive combinatorial auctions. Very few mechanisms are known for these settings and the question is: Can we prove that no other truthful mechanisms exist? We characterize truthful mechanisms for n players and 2 tasks or items, as either task-independent, or a player-grouping minimizer, a new class of mechanisms we discover, which generalizes affine minimizers. We assume decisiveness, strong monotonicity and that the truthful payments (The (normalized) payments are uniquely determined by the allocation function of the mechanism; thus the assumptions concern properties of the allocation.) are continuous functions of players' bids.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/86","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0086.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/86.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/bibtex/86","volume":{"slug":"2015","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2015","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/","year":2015,"location":"Buenos Aires, Argentina","dates":"25–31 July 2015","editors":"Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge","isbn":"978-1-57735-738-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":"Game Theory","track":"Main Track","number":86,"pages":{"first":568,"last":573},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}