Optimal Incremental Preference Elicitation during Negotiation
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 3-8.
Abstract
The last two decades have seen a growing interest in the development of automated agents that are able to negotiate on the user's behalf. When representing a user in a negotiation, it is essential for the agent to understand the user's preferences, without exposing them to elicitation fatigue. To this end, we propose a new model in which a negotiating agent may incrementally elicit the user's preference during the negotiation. We introduce an optimal elicitation strategy that decides, at every stage of the negotiation, how much additional user information to extract at a certain cost. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by combining our policy with well-known negotiation strategies and show that it significantly outperforms other elicitation strategies.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p8,
title = {Optimal Incremental Preference Elicitation during Negotiation},
author = {Baarslag, Tim and Gerding, Enrico H.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {3--8},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/8},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Optimal Incremental Preference Elicitation during Negotiation AU - Baarslag, Tim AU - Gerding, Enrico H. T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 3 EP - 8 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/8 ER -Copied
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