Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 468-473.
Abstract
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or all mechanisms for several commonly used classes of sequential allocation mechanisms. In particular, we consider whether a given agent receives a given item, a set of items, or a subset of items for natural classes of sequential allocation mechanisms: balanced, recursively balanced, balanced alternation, and strict alternation. We present characterizations of the allocations that result respectively from the classes, which extend the well-known characterization by Brams and King [2005] for policies without restrictions. In addition, we examine the computational complexity of possible and necessary allocation problems for these classes.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p72,
title = {Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms},
author = {Aziz, Haris and Walsh, Toby and Xia, Lirong},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {468--473},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/72},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms AU - Aziz, Haris AU - Walsh, Toby AU - Xia, Lirong T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 468 EP - 473 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/72 ER -Copied
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