An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Games under Ambiguities
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 271-277.
Abstract
Security is a critical concern around the world. Since resources for security are always limited, lots of interest have arisen in using game theory to handle security resource allocation problems. However, most of the existing work does not address adequately how a defender chooses his optimal strategy in a game with absent, inaccurate, uncertain, and even ambiguous strategy profiles' payoffs. To address this issue, we propose a general framework of security games under ambiguities based on Dempster-Shafer theory and the ambiguity aversion principle of minimax regret. Then, we reveal some properties of this framework. Also, we present two methods to reduce the influence of complete ignorance. Our investigation shows that this new framework is better in handling security resource allocation problems under ambiguities.
@inproceedings{ijcai2013p49,
title = {An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Games under Ambiguities},
author = {Ma, Wenjun and Luo, Xudong and Liu, Weiru},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Francesca Rossi},
pages = {271--277},
year = {2013},
month = {8},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/49},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Games under Ambiguities AU - Ma, Wenjun AU - Luo, Xudong AU - Liu, Weiru T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2013 SP - 271 EP - 277 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/49 ER -Copied
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