Language-Based Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 2967-2970.
Abstract
We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [Koszegi and Rabin, 2006], which extend the domain of the utility function to "situations", maximal consistent sets in some language. The role of the underlying language in this framework thus becomes particularly critical. Of particular interest are situations where the language can express only coarse beliefs [Mullainathan, 2002]. Despite the expressive power of the approach, we show that it it can describe games in a simple, natural way. Nash equilibrium and rationalizability are generalized to this setting; Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist in general, while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild conditions.
@inproceedings{ijcai2013p438,
title = {Language-Based Games},
author = {Bjorndahl, Adam and Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pass, Rafael},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Francesca Rossi},
pages = {2967--2970},
year = {2013},
month = {8},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/438},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Language-Based Games AU - Bjorndahl, Adam AU - Halpern, Joseph Y. AU - Pass, Rafael T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2013 SP - 2967 EP - 2970 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/438 ER -Copied
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