Proceedings

Regret Minimization in Multiplayer Extensive Games

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 2802-2802.

https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-473

© 2011 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

The counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithm is state-of-the-art for computing strategies in large games and other sequential decision-making problems. Little is known, however, about CFR in games with more than 2 players. This extended abstract outlines research towards a better understanding of CFR in multiplayer games and new procedures for computing even stronger multiplayer strategies. We summarize work already completed that investigates techniques for creating expert strategies for playing smaller sub-games, and work that proves CFR avoids classes of undesirable strategies. In addition, we provide an outline of our future research direction. Our goals are to apply regret minimization to the problem of playing multiple games simultaneously, and augment CFR to achieve effective on-line opponent modelling of multiple opponents. The objective of this research is to build a world-class computer poker player for multiplayer Limit Texas Hold'em.

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