Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 186-190.
Abstract
In elections, an alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a setvalued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where instead of domination by a majority of voters we require domination by a given fraction theta of voters; we refer to this concept as theta-winning set. We explore social choice-theoretic and algorithmic aspects of these solution concepts, both theoretically and empirically.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p42,
title = {Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion},
author = {Elkind, Edith and Lang, Jérôme and Saffidine, Abdallah},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {186--190},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-042},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-042},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Choosing Collectively Optimal Sets of Alternatives Based on the Condorcet Criterion AU - Elkind, Edith AU - Lang, Jérôme AU - Saffidine, Abdallah T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 186 EP - 190 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-042 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-042 ER -Copied
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