A Market Clearing Solution for Social Lending
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 152-156.
Abstract
The social lending market, with over a billion dollars in loans, is a two-sided matching market where borrowers specify demands and lenders specify total budgets and their desired interest rates from each acceptable borrower. Because different borrowers correspond to different risk-return profiles, lenders have preferences over acceptable borrowers; a borrower prefers lenders in order of the interest rates they offer to her. We investigate the question of what is a computationally feasible, 'good', allocation to clear this market. We design a strongly polynomial time algorithm for computing a Pareto-efficient stable outcome in a two-sided many-to-many matching market within differences, and use this to compute an allocation for the social lending market that satisfies the properties of stability — a standard notion of fairness in two-sided matching markets — and Pareto efficiency; and additionally addresses envy-freeness amongst similar borrowers and risk diversification for lenders.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p37,
title = {A Market Clearing Solution for Social Lending},
author = {Chen, Ning and Ghosh, Arpita},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {152--156},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-037},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-037},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Market Clearing Solution for Social Lending AU - Chen, Ning AU - Ghosh, Arpita T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 152 EP - 156 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-037 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-037 ER -Copied
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