Social Distance Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 91-95.
Abstract
In this paper we introduce and analyze social distance games, a family of non-transferable utility coalitional games where an agent's utility is a measure of closeness to the other members of the coalition. We study both social welfare maximisation and stability in these games using a graph theoretic perspective. We use the stability gap to investigate the welfare of stable coalition structures, and propose two new solution concepts with improved welfare guarantees. We argue that social distance games are both interesting in themselves, as well as in the context of social networks.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p27,
title = {Social Distance Games},
author = {Brânzei, Simina and Larson, Kate},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {91--95},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Social Distance Games AU - Brânzei, Simina AU - Larson, Kate T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 91 EP - 95 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-027 ER -Copied
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