Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs

Abstract

We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coalitional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coalition structures. For simple games without coalition structures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core nonemptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Nicholas Robert Jennings