Generating Bayes-Nash Equilibria to Design Autonomous Trading Agents
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1543-1549.
Abstract
This paper presents a methodology for designing trading agents for complex games. We compute, for the first time, Bayes-Nash equilibria for first-price single-unit auctions and mth-price multi-unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. To evaluate this approach we used our analysis to generate strategies for the International Trading Agent Competition. One of these was evaluated as the best overall and was subsequently used very successfully by our agent WhiteBear in the 2005 competition.
@inproceedings{ijcai2007p249,
title = {Generating Bayes-Nash Equilibria to Design Autonomous Trading Agents},
author = {Vetsikas, Ioannis A. and Jennings, Nicholas R. and Selman, Bart},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-07}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Ramon López de Mántaras},
pages = {1543--1549},
year = {2007},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/249},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Generating Bayes-Nash Equilibria to Design Autonomous Trading Agents AU - Vetsikas, Ioannis A. AU - Jennings, Nicholas R. AU - Selman, Bart T2 - Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-07 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2007 SP - 1543 EP - 1549 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/249 ER -Copied
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