Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1366-1370.
Abstract
In many real-world collective decision problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables. The prohibitive size of such domains makes it practically impossible to represent preference relations explicitly. Now, AI has been developing languages for representing preferences on such domains in a succinct way, exploiting structural properties such as conditional preferential independence. Here we reconsider voting and aggregation rules in the case where voters' preferences have a common preferential independence structure, and address the decompossition a voting rule or an aggregation function following a linear order over variables.
@inproceedings{ijcai2007p220,
title = {Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences},
author = {Lang, Jérôme},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-07}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Ramon López de Mántaras},
pages = {1366--1370},
year = {2007},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/220},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Vote and Aggregation in Combinatorial Domains with Structured Preferences AU - Lang, Jérôme T2 - Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-07 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2007 SP - 1366 EP - 1370 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/220 ER -Copied
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