Proceedings

Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings

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Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1239-1243.

Abstract

Mechanisms for dividing a set of goods amongst a number of autonomous agents need to balance efficiency and fairness requirements. A common interpretation of fairness is envy-freeness, while efficiency is usually understood as yielding maximal overall utility. We show how to set up a distributed negotiation framework that will allow a group of agents to reach an allocation of goods that is both efficient and envy-free.

Yann Chevaleyre, Ulrich Endriss, Sylvia Estivie, and Nicolas Maudet. 2007. Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings. In Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-07. IJCAI, 1239–1243. https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/200
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