Quantified Coalition Logic
Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 1181-1185.
Abstract
We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express properties as there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve Phi. We give an axiomatization of QCL, and show that while it is no more expressive than Coalition Logic, it is exponentially more succinct. The time complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents.
@inproceedings{ijcai2007p191,
title = {Quantified Coalition Logic},
author = {Ågotnes, Thomas and van der Hoek, Wiebe and Wooldridge, Michael J.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-07}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Ramon López de Mántaras},
pages = {1181--1185},
year = {2007},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/191},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Quantified Coalition Logic AU - Ågotnes, Thomas AU - van der Hoek, Wiebe AU - Wooldridge, Michael J. T2 - Proceedings of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-07 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2007 SP - 1181 EP - 1185 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2007/191 ER -Copied
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