A Logical Model of Nash Bargaining Solution
Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 983-989.
Abstract
This paper presents a logical extension of Nash’s Cooperative Bargaining Theory. We introduce a concept of entrenchment measurement, which maps propositions to real numbers, as a vehicle to represent agent’s belief states and attitudes towards bargaining situations. We show that Nash’s bargaining solution can be restated in terms of bargainers belief states. Negotiable items, bargaining outcomes and conflicting arguments can then be explicitly expressed in propositional logic meanwhile Nash’s numerical solution to bargaining problem is still applicable.
@inproceedings{ijcai2005p33,
title = {A Logical Model of Nash Bargaining Solution},
author = {Zhang, Dongmo},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-05}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
pages = {983--989},
year = {2005},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/33},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Logical Model of Nash Bargaining Solution AU - Zhang, Dongmo T2 - Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-05 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2005 SP - 983 EP - 989 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2005/33 ER -Copied
Machine-readable versions of this paper, for tools and AI agents:
